The ‘Gänseliesel’ (Goose Girlis), a historical fountain erected in 1901, represents the most well-known landmark of the city of Goettingen.

Unpacking Economic and Social Rights: International and Comparative Dimensions - Conference

The Goettingen Journal of International Law is pleased to announce that we will take part in a conference in November 2018. The joint research project of the Institute of International and European Law of the University of Göttingen and the Minerva Center for Human Rights at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law will be holding this conference in Göttingen, Germany under the title “Unpacking Economic and Social Rights: International and Comparative Dimensions”. The conference is a culmination of a joint research project directed by Prof. Tomer Broude and Prof. Andreas L. Paulus and examines economic and social rights from a comparative perspective, looking at German, Israeli and European legal systems and their respective constitutional, legislative and jurisprudential experiences, as well as the universal human rights framework under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition to this call, Prof. Paulus and Prof. Broude, junior researchers of the project and associate and invited scholars will present their research at the conference.

Scholars who work on economic and social rights are invited to submit abstracts. The proceedings of the conference and papers presented will be published in one of our upcoming issues. See the call for papers and the conference website for more details.

Deadline for submission of Abstracts: 1 June 2018. Accepted proposals will be notified by 1 July 2018. Full papers due for submission by 1 November 2018.

For queries and clarifications – please contact

Yes, We Can (Control Them)! – Regulatory Agencies: Trustees or Agents?

Stefan Handke



This article raises the question over whether there have been changes in the mode of delegation between national executives and national regulatory agencies in the financial sector caused by the financial market crisis. Illustrated by the case of Germany, the two following ideal types of delegation are elaborated and applied to the case of the German supervisory authority BaFin: principal-agent theory and trust theory. For the periods before and after the crisis, political influence on the agency is examined and – with its intentions and results – assigned to one of the two ideal types. With this approach the financial market crises cannot be identified as the trigger for changes in the mode of delegation but merely as a kind of catalyst.



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